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THE NATURAL LAW
PHILOSOPHY OF
LON L. FULLER
CHARLES L. PALMS, C.S.P.*t
M UCH OF THE NEW EMPHASIS on natural law can be traced to the
failure of positivism, the prevailing legal philosophy, to give
meaningful answers to the problems of life in society; also to the fear
generated by the dreadful experiences of "lawless law" enacted by
totalitarian dictatorships like Adolph Hitler's.
One contemporary legal philosopher who has been vitally aware of
the failure of legal positivism and who was articulately urging a return
to the natural law even before the full tragedy of Hitler had run its
course, is the present Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at the
Harvard Law School, Lon Luvois Fuller.
Professor Fuller was born at Hereford, Texas, in 1902. He received
his Bachelor of Arts degree from Stanford University in 1924. After
acquiring his Doctor of Laws degree from Stanford in 1926, Professor
Fuller taught at the University of Oregon Law School (1926-1928), the
University of Illinois College of Law (1928-1931) and Duke University
Law School (1931-1939). Since 1940, Professor Fuller has been asso-
* B.S.S., Georgetown University; LL.B., Harvard Law School; M.A., St. Paul's
College; Associate Editor, THE CATHOLIC WORLD.
t Just as the law is divided into substance and procedure, so the natural law
philosophy of Lon L. Fuller conveniently divides itself into a substantive aspect
and a procedural one. Fuller's natural law philosophy is not complete unless
it is presented under both aspects. Under the substantive rubric, Fuller probes
the meaning of law as it relates to the proper ends to be sought through legal
rules. In dealing with the procedural aspect, Fuller studies the necessary pre-
conditions for good law, such as promulgation, clarity, proper administration
and enforcement, etc.
It is difficult for the student of legal theory to find a systematic presentation
of Professor Fuller's legal philosophy. Much of Fuller's legal writing is to be
found in occasional law review articles and book reviews. Until the present
article was written, no comprehensive presentation of Fuller's natural law ap-
roach to the substantive aspect of law existed. Professor Fuller himself has recently
provided us with an organized presentation of the procedural aspect, which he
terms the "internal morality of law" (The Morality of Law, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1964). The present article, combined with Fuller's recent book,
makes it possible for the student of legal theory to examine the natural law
thinking of one of America's foremost legal philosophers.
IWard, The 'Natural Law' Rebound, 21 REV. OF POLITICS 119-20 (1959).
FULLER
ciated with the Harvard Law School. He
is also on the Editorial Board of the
Natural Law Forum. Father Leo R. Ward,
C.S.C., Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, has referred to one
of Professor Fuller's books as "one of the
simplest and most modest and yet most
deceptively powerful affirmations of natu-
ral law in our time..... .
The present study of Fuller's natural
law philosophy consists of two basic parts:
the first presents Fuller's critical exposition
of the inadequacies of legal positivism;
the second sets forth Fuller's own natural
law views.
Critique of Legal Positivism
In 1939 Professor Fuller wrote, in re-
viewing Hall's Readings in Jurisprudence:
Often what an author "stands for" is much
less important than how he got to where
he is standing; the negative side of a man's
work, his critique of opposing views, is
often-perhaps usually-more important
than his affirmations. 4
The next year Professor Fuller presented
the negative side of his own work, a
lucid critique of the influence of positivist
theories on American law.5 Tracing the
history of positivist theories from English
philosopher Thomas Hobbes through the
so-called American Legal Realists and the
Vienna School of Hans Kelsen, Fuller ar-
gues that legal positivism is intellectually
unsound and that its teachings have dis-
astrous practical results for society.
English Positivism
Legal positivism developed in England
2 FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
" Ward, supra note 1, at 116.
4 Fuller, Book Review, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 625-26
(1939).
S FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2.
as a result of the law's quest for an exclu-
sive hegemony of its own where it could
be free from the complications of ethics
and philosophy., Hobbes believed that the
prime objective of law was to achieve
peace and order in society. Ethics and phi-
losophy complicated things by supplying
reasons for ignoring or disobeying the law.
Because the interests of men tended to
conflict, and because resort to reason was
unable to bring about the requisite peace
and order in society, sovereign authority
had to be the dominant influence in so-
ciety. This authority resided in the king or
protector, and the rules of the sovereign
for settling disputes were the law. Accord-
ing to Hobbes' theory, the law was su-
preme and men had to blindly obey re-
gardless of personal belief.'.
Hobbes, however, did not entirely aban-
don reason. Ideally, the sovereign was to
follow it and enact reasonable legislation.
But if the sovereign were unreasonable,
and enacted an unjust law, the reasonable
man would be expected to obey the law
in the interests of peace and order." Thus,
public order would replace justice as the
ultimate criterion of law.
About a century later, John Austin
agreed with Hobbes that the starting point
for law could not be that which is right
or just. This would be "cut-throat science"
leading to social upheaval.0 It was the sov-
ereign that gave coherence to the legal sys-
tem and offered a clear-cut definition of
law. Therefore, Austin defined law as the
command of the state. In Austin's opinion,
however, Hobbes had oversimplified the
6 Id. at 16-17.
7 Id. at 19-25, 86-87.
3 Ibid.
. Fuller, American Lggal Philosophy at Mid-
Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 459-60 (1954).
nature of the sovereign. Austin wanted to
identify the sovereign precisely. Once he
had located the sovereign, he felt that he
would have the essence of law and thereby
pinpoint the unifying force in law.
Austin found it difficult to locate the
sovereign, however, because the system of
checks and balances had complicated the
structure of the state. How to explain law
laid down by judges independent of the
king? To Hobbes, the judge was the agent
of the sovereign, and the ruler adopted the
judge's decision as his own. Austin could
not accept this answer; it was more meta-
phor than actual fact. Austin, therefore,
redefined the sovereign as that person or
group of persons which society was in the
habit of obeying. Thus, Austin rested the
foundations of the legal order on habit or
custom.1 0
Professor Fuller notes that instead of
solving the theoretical problems raised by
Hobbes' analysis of the law, Austin's de-
velopment raises more embarrassing ques-
tions. Suppose, the bulk of society ceases
to render obedience to law - what hap-
pens to the sovereign? Suppose certain
commands of the sovereign are occasion-
ally ignored - is the ignored command
still law? Suppose the sovereign issues con-
tradictory commands - which one is the
law? Suppose the sovereign declares that
his power is legally limited, for example,
by a two-thirds vote of the populace -is
the real sovereign power in the people?
Finally, the most difficult question of all
- suppose there -are gaps in the law?
Doesn't every gap represent a possible
point of entry for ethics and philosophy,
the very complication that Hobbes and
Austin were trying to eliminate from the
- Ibid. FuLI.ER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 26-31.
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law?11 One answer to this last question is
that there really are no gaps in the law
of the sovereign. What the sovereign has
not forbidden he implicitly permits. This
answer is typical of the fantasy that Aus-
tin's theory had led him into.
Professor Fuller points out that in de-
fining the law in terms of its source (the
sovereign) the positivists had one advan-
tage. They could point to a statute or a
command and say, "This is law." What
the sovereign does is clear; it makes posi-
tivism possible. But a question that re-
mained unresolved in the theories of
Hobbes and Austin was the precise identity
of the sovereign. Fuller asks:
Is it (the sovereign) a real thing, a datum
of nature existing apart from men's think-
ing? Or is it merely a way of viewing the
world of possible legal phenomena? Is it
an actuality, or a metaphor?12
Austin's writings were tinged with am-
biguity on this point, 3 and anxious to
clear up the problem, Austin's philosophi-
cal heirs diverged along two lines: the
"realists," and the "pure law" theorists.14
In America and Europe a school of
legal "realists," enamoured with the sci-
entific method, abandoned the metaphori-
cal sovereign of Hobbes and the ephemeral
custom of Austin, and rested the basis of
law on a more concrete datum of nature.
They sought law in external reality just as
the physicist seeks physical laws in the lab-
oratory experiment. They wanted a law
easily identified and purified of ethics and
morality.15
In Vienna, another school developed.
11 FULLER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 33-38.
1 Id. at 45.
,Id. at 46.
14 Id. at 46-47.
1 Id. at 46-47, 53.
FULLER
Hans Kelsen saw the futility of founding
law either in the sovereign or custom or
other datum of nature. Kelsen believed in
an ideal of pure law - purified of morality
which he called "wish law."' 6 Realizing,
however, that this pure law could not be
founded in a datum of nature, he was bold
enough to base his pure law on a simple
methodological assumption. 7
A merican Positivism
Professor Fuller, concerned principally
with legal positivism as it has affected the
American scene, concentrates his critique
of legal positivism primarily on the Amer-
ican legal realists. The more prominent
members of this school include John Gray,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Joseph W. Bing-
ham, Walter Wheeler Cook, Karl N.
Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, W. Underhill
Moore and Edwin W. Patterson.
John Chipman Gray, in his Nature and
Sources of Law, abandoning Austin's cri-
teria of custom, reverted to Hobbes' sover-
eign, utilizing however, a more scientific
approach. He held that the sovereign was
not a "determinate" group of persons but
a shifting and anonymous body. The state
was an artificial unity; the real unifying
principle in the practice of an attorney was
the judge, a flesh and blood reality. Here
was a concentration of power in a definite
human being. The law was, therefore, de-
fined as "the rules laid down by the
courts."' 6
Professor Fuller points out that Gray
has not yet answered all the questions.
What about the "inconsiderate" sovereign
- two judges at odds with each other who
hand down contrary opinions? And sup-
1 Id. at 5.
17 Id. at 47.
1,1 Id. at 49.
pose that when a number of judges are
sitting in judgment on a case that the
"majority" lays down a decision. A major-
ity is a corporate entity, and the flesh and
blood reality that the "realists" had found
in the judge-made rule is lost. Gray ended
up with the same problem that Austin
never solved - trying to identify the sov-
ereign.' 9
Oliver Wendell Holmes had reservations
of his own about Gray's definition of law
as "the rules laid down by the court." He
saw that what judges say is different from
what judges do. Holmes suggested that the
definition of law should be the rules acted
on by courts. This tendency of the realists
in the direction of increasing realism was
taken up by Bingham, Cook, Llewellyn
and Frank. Agreeing with Holmes, they
defined law in terms of the patterns of
judicial behavior. Law was a generaliza-
tion of the way judges act. Just as the be-
havior of atoms was the concern of the
physicist, so the behavior of judges was the
concern of the lawyer. 2 Why, asks Profes-
sor Fuller, stop at the behavior patterns of
judges? What about the behavior of com-
missioners, the sheriff and the sanitary
inspector? These officials make rules that
affect us- ones that they talk about and
then act on. Wouldn't every state official
have to be included within the realist
schema? 21
Professor Underhill Moore took the be-
havioristic approach one step further. He
held that law was determined by "institu-
tional patterns of behavior.'" 22 Banking
Law, for example, would be determined
19 Ibid.
201d. at 51-53.
21 Id. at 53.
22 Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 429, 453 (1934).
in part by the observed behavior patterns
of bank tellers. Professor Fuller objects to
Moore's behavioristic approach. He points
out that behavior is often the expression of
underlying mental attitudes, and that an
analysis of these attitudes of mind involves
more than the mere rationalization of be-
havior.2 3 Moreover, regularities of behavior
do not always provide the norm of the pat-
tern. Often it is the unusual case that pro-
vides the norm because in such a case, the
mental attitude behind the pattern is
shown. It is not the behavior itself, but the
purpose behind the behavior that is im-
portant to the lawyer and judge. For judges
to simply search out and catalogue the
habits of bank tellers is to make the bank
teller the judge instead of the man sitting
on the bench.2 4
Finally, Professor Fuller asks, even if
behavior patterns are the basis of law, how
are judges to know these behavior patterns
in deciding cases? Can these patterns be
observed and recorded?25 Is there some
way that judges' attitudes and ideas are
moulded by a cultural matrix whose pat-
terns are engraved by frequency? How
does a judge get to know all the patterns
of activity of bank tellers?26 Fuller suggests
that the realists' insistence on law as a be-
havior pattern is reliance on an even
greater phantom than Austin's sovereign. 27
Kelsenianism
Hans Kelsen reacted against absurdities
implicit in the theories of the legal realists
and their Austinian forebears. He believed
in the positivist ideal- purifying the law
3 Id. at 455.
'4 Id. at 457-58.
FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 57.
_0 Fuller, supra note 22, at 459.
- FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 59.
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of the complications of ethics and morality
and of every non-legal influence. He could
not accept, however, the realist approach
to this ideal. The realists were trying to
separate the law that is (the "pure law"
datum of nature) from the law that ought
to be (ethics and morality). Yet realism
yielded no useful test of this law that is.
Ultimately, every kind of behavior pattern
was law. There was no standard behavior
that was not law, i.e., mis-behavior. Be-
sides, the study of behavior was not prop-
erly legal study at all. 28
Going back to Austin, Kelsen saw that
the English jurist was begging the whole
question by assuming that the sovereign
was the essence of law. Kelsen asked, if
the sovereign defines what is law, how do
we define and describe this sovereign ex-
cept by a prior legal order that the sover-
eign admittedly does not enact?
29
Isn't the very sovereign who defines a
law, brought into existence and delimited
by some pre-existing procedural law which
places the law-making power in the hands
of the sovereign in the first place? Law
then becomes law in virtue of rules that
are not "law.."
30
Kelsen pushed his search for "pure law"
to its logical conclusions. He saw that the
search for the sovereign begun by Austin
and continued by the realists ended in ab-
surdity. Yet Kelsen believed that Austin's
sovereign served a good purpose. The sov-
ereign prevented ethics and morality from
complicating the law. Thus, Kelsen re-
tained the purpose for which the sovereign
existed and rejected the search for the sov-
ereign in any flesh and blood reality.
Kelsen, therefore, carefully analyzed the
28 Id. at 66-69.
29 Id. at 81.
30 Fuller, supra note 9, at 460-61.
FULLER
purpose that the sovereign served, adopted
the minimum of assumptions necessary to
accomplish this purpose and set these as-
sumptions down in a sort of charter. His
law was not, therefore, founded in any
flesh and blood reality like the sovereign or
judicial behavior, but rather upon a fiction
- a methodological premise. Kelsen whit-
tled his starting point down to a minimum
of metaphor. He made an honest fiction
out of positivismA1
Instead of the sovereign of Austin or
judicial behavior patterns of the realists,
Kelsen substituted the idea of the "basic
norm." Professor Fuller points out that
Kelsen's theory of the "basic norm" admits
that one must accept at least one pre-exist-
ing rule governing the law-making process
before the law-making process itself can
get started. The basic norm, being ex-
pressed in the singular, reduces this in-
dispensable starting point to an ideal but
fictitious minimum.32
Professor Fuller concludes that though
realism and Kelsenianism commence in op-
posite directions, they terminate with much
in common. Both reject the unreal sover-
eign of Austin. Both see that as soon as
the law tries to become "scientific" the
road forks sharply, one branch leading to
the realm of pure fact (the realists), the
other leading to the realm of pure assump-
tion (Kelsenianism). Each takes a differ-
ent branch and is determined to follow it
logically and uncompromisingly. Each
reaps the results of its own limitation of
method . 3
Separation of "Is" and "Ought"
Professor Fuller is not interested in mak-
31 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 69-75.
'1 Fuller, supra note 9, at 461.
33 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 76.
ing a critique of legal positivism for criti-
cism's sake. His critique of positivism is
more a by-product of his unrelenting quest
for the underlying assumption of the law
and legal theories. He has called his quest
a rationalistic one. In pushing reason as far
as he can, Fuller sees the purpose of legal
philosophy as a quest for those principles
that make possible the successful liv-
ing together of men.34 He sees the basic
task of the lawyer as a search for truth and
justice'--finding ways by which people can
live and work together successfully.-" The
task of the lawyer goes on in a dynamic
social order, and law must be able to re-
spond to ever changing situations." The
ideal is a just social order, and the law
must always struggle to approach this ideal.
Professor Fuller sees the quest of the
positivist as stopping precariously short of
the goal of law. Positivism does not seek to
promote ethical or moral or social goals
for society. A positivist is fearful of ethics
and morality which he believes confuse and
distort the law. Positivism claims to have
discovered the raw datum of law-the
basic fact of law beyond which ethical re-
search is useless2 8
The first principle of positivism is this:
law can be discovered, sought out, exam-
ined and defined3 1 It is not the expression
of the non-existent ideal of justice. In any
given rule of conduct there is a basic dis-
tinction between what is in fact the law, and
what that law ought to be. Therefore, the
31 Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV. 35,
46 (1950).
35 Fuller, Objectives of Legal Education, 2 REC-
ORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 120, 121 (1947).
36 FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
694 (1949).
13 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 121.
:18 Id. at 109.
: 9 Fuller, supra note 4, at 627.
task of the legal philosopher is to give the
principles for making this distinction, and
the task of the lawyer is to find out what
the law actually is.4°
Austin's positivism meant something set
(positus) by the human will of the sover-
eign;4' therefore, the law that is was found
in the expressed will of the sovereign. The
realists, as stated previously, ultimately lo-
cated the law that is in the behavior pat-
terns of judges. Others who fall into the
general classification of positivists either
hold that the law that is can be found in
some observable phenomena, or hold with
Kelsen, that the law that is is not found in
the observable, but is located in a meth-
odological premise.
Professor Fuller's argument with posi-
tivism goes much deeper than occasional
objections to the particular theories of Aus-
tin, Kelsen and the legal realists. Fuller at-
tacks positivism at its very core. He takes
the basic premise of the positivists-the
striving for a complete separation of the is
and the ought in law-and shows first that
it cannot be justified in terms of reality.
He thereafter points out in example after
example how this attempted separation
leads to disastrous consequences in prac-
tice.
The thesis that has dominated Professor
Fuller's writing over the years is the in-
separability of is and ought in the law. In
1940 he wrote: "In the field of purposive
human activity, which includes.., the law,
value and being are not two different
things, but two aspects of an integral re-
ality. '4 2 Sixteen years after the above was
written, Professor Fuller was still making
the same point:
40 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4-6, 55-56,
60-61.
41 Fuller, supra note 4, at 627.
42 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 11.
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The problem I have in mind is that which
arises when we attempt to reconcile the now
generally accepted dichotomy of fact and
value with a purposive interpretation of
human behavior. For it is my thesis that
when we accept the full consequences that
flow from a view which treats human ac-
tion as goal-directed, the relation between
fact and value assumes an aspect entirely
different from that implied in the alleged
"truism" that from what is nothing what-
ever follows as to what ought to be .43
Professor Fuller always brings his thesis
down to the concrete test of its soundness.
In simple examples he shows that what the
law is cannot be separated from what it is
for, and what it is for cannot be separated
from what it ought to be.
A judge, for example, cannot properly
interpret a law without considering its pur-
pose. Positivists have tried to argue that
words have a core of meaning and that this
core is enough for the judge to work with.
Fuller poses the case of a statute which ex-
cludes "vehicles" from parks, and then
asks if such a law would exclude a truck
used in World War II mounted on a pede-
stal as a memorial.44
One cannot interpret a word in a statute
without knowing the aim of the statute.
Suppose a statute reads: "All improve-
ments must be promptly reported to. .. ."
Notice how the meaning of "improve-
ments" changes when you fill in "to the
head nurse," or "to the town planning
authority." The word "improvements" has
no extra-legal standard that helps interpre-
tation here. We know what the rule is only
in the light of what the rule ought to be.45
43 Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3
NATURAL L. F. 64, 68 (1958).
44 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Re-
ply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
661-63 (1958).
I' Id. at 664-66.
FULLER
In another example, Professor Fuller
supposes that an engineer, awkward in
English, drafts instructions for the assembly
of a machine. A professor of English and
a mechanic both read and follow the in-
structions. The professor applies the words
of the instructions in their literal sense and
gets into trouble. The mechanic hardly
notices the literal meaning and looks to
what the engineer was trying to say. He as-
sembles the machine easily. The professor
was refraining from "value judgments" and
kept the distinction between is and ought.
But Fuller asks, who penetrated most truly
to the empirical fact of these instructions,
the professor of English or the mechanic?"
Positivism makes the rigid distinction be-
tween is and ought in order to promote
clear thinking in law. But Fuller asks if
clarity in legal discussions is really ad-
vanced by this sharp distinction. The draw-
ing of distinctions is not an activity that
can be an end in itself. Fuller facetiously
supposes that one might write a long trea-
tise on the sharp distinction between pie
and cake "disposing definitively of all the
hard borderline cases, like Boston cream
pie and upside-down cake. .. ." Nor is it
an answer to say that the distinction be-
tween is and ought involves the distinction
between law and morality, that these con-
cepts are important, and therefore must be
distinguished. Is it important to distinguish
pie and cake because they deal with the
important subject of human nutriment? The
question is, whether drawing the sharp line
is important. Does making this distinction
really dispel confusion? Does it really
help?48
a1 Fuller, supra note 9, at 469.
47 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 86.
4S Id. at 85-89.
When Professor Fuller rejects the posi-
tivist attempt to exclude ought from the
law by making an absolute distinction be-
tween is and ought, he does not deny that
there is some legitimate distinction between
fact and value, and that it can be useful.
Fuller's point is that the absolute distinc-
tion cannot be made the basic premise of
any legal philosophy because it is not in
accord with basic reality in which the is
and the ought are both present. One can-
not confine one's study to the is in the law
and exclude the ought. Both are part of
an integral reality. The distinction between
is and ought may be useful for analyti-
cal purposes, but it cannot be assumed as a
starting point."' In other words, the analy-
sis of law must begin with experience, not
self-imposed abstraction. One cannot sepa-
rate the inseparable; and the positivist at-
tempt to make such a separation leads to
unfortunate results.
The attempt to eliminate the ought from
the law has tremendous implications in the
life work of the judge, the lawyer, the pro-
fessor and student of law and the legal
scholar. 50
The judge: Shall he be faithful to exist-
ing law, or assume a more creative role?
Suppose he has impulses toward reform?
Can he improve a tradition while transmit-
ting it?' Not as a positivist.
The lawyer preparing a brief: Shall he
argue the letter or the spirit of the law?
Shall he argue the rights of his client or the
rightness of the case? 52 Positivism dismisses
the argument of "rightness."
4' Id. at 7-12; Fuller, supra note 22, at 451-52.
5 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2-4.
Id. at 12; Fuller, supra note 44, at 646-47.
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 12
(1940).
The professor: How shall he teach? Will
he ignore the ethical foundations of the law
-the law that ought to be?53 He will as a
positivist.
The student: Shall he seek the profes-
sor who expounds "the existing law," or
the one who delves into the "shifting ethi-
cal background of the law?" '54 A positivist
seeks the law that is.
The scholar: Shall his legal writing state
the law or his ideas of what the law ought
to be?55 Ought is outside the realm of posi-
tivism.
Positivism, in taking creativity (ought-
ness) out of law, tends to reduce law to a
pure science., Thus, positivism fails to
give a profitable and satisfying direction to
the creative application of human energies
in the law. It defeats the very function of
legal philosophy-to decide how the law-
yer may best spend his professional life.57
Ideally, the administration of a legisla-
tive or decisional rule is a process by which
the rule is enabled, through the constant
purposive reinterpretation of judges in
varying factual situations, to become more
and more what it ought to be. Positivism,
in excluding purpose or oughtness, delib-
erately takes the striving for perfection out
of the law. The law, instead of growing and
reproducing itself anew in each fresh fac-
tual situation, remains sterile.58
Positivism is scientific. It seeks to extract
the law that is, leaving to politics or some
other discipline the law that ought to be.
In failing to say anything significant about
the content and purpose of law, positivism
loses its capacity to say anything at all
53 Id. at 13-14.
54 Id. at 15.
5a Id. at 14, 38-39.
56d. at 91.
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id. at 88-89, 99.
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about specific rules of law or specific prob-
lems of legislation or decision. Positivism,
in becoming a pure science, ends up by
confining itself to terminological disputes. 59
Professor Fuller cites some examples as
evidence of the sterility and formalism of
positivism. (1) The notes on recent cases
published in the various law reviews in the
nation and written by law students reflect
a good cross section of the working philos-
ophy of our law schools. Usually these
notes deal with cases that touch the law at
a vital spot-where it is growing. Instead
of trying to see if the law is growing in the
right direction, the analyst usually objects
to the fact that the law is growing. Often
the dissatisfied analyst will write that the
decision was based on "extra-legal consid-
erations" which are not discussed by the
student authors. Obviously the law that
ought to be is not legally relevant to these
students." (2) The modern preference for
legislation as a means of legal reform indi-
cates that lawyers and judges do not suffi-
ciently recognize the purposive and crea-
tive element in the law.61 (3) In Britain,
the law has become so formalized that
commercial cases seek arbitration rather
than judicial adjudication. Arbitrators are
willing to take into account the changing
needs of commerce and the ordinary stand-
ards of commercial fairness. The judicial
law that is refuses to bend to needs that
demand a law that ought to be.6 2 (4) In
this country where our written Constitution
is authoritatively interpreted by a Supreme
Court, lawyers unfortunately think more
about what the Supreme Court will do, i.e.,
,, Id. at 91.
611 ld. at 128.
I; d. at 130.
62 Fuller, supra note 44, at 637-38.
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the "legality" of a problem or doubtful pro-
cedure, instead of seeking to articulate the
restraints that must be accepted to insure
orderly, fair and decent government. 63
Not only has legal thinking been stifled,
but fact analysis as well. Is and ought are
mixed in with facts as well as with law.
As a result of positivist concentration on
the is element in factual analysis, there has
been an emphasis on those facts which can
be statistically or graphically presented. Yet
Fuller points out, some of the most signifi-
cant facts involve intangible realities, such
as moral facts, lying not in behavior pat-
terns, but in attitudes and conceptions of
rightness.'-
Professor Fuller points out that we are
living in an era of great basic changes in
our social structure. Positivism, by con-
centrating on what the law is, tends to
freeze the law and the legal framework.
Human relations continue to develop and
take on new forms, but the law which ex-
cludes oughtness fails to respond to the
pressing needs of the times." Fuller de-
scribes positivism's most dangerous quality
as "the inhibitive effect it inevitably has
upon the development of a spontaneous or-
dering of human relations. ... "66
Along with its inhibitive effect is the
fact that positivism encourages a blind
obedience to law. The law is not followed
because of its reasonableness or its capac-
ity to effect a happy compromise among
conflicting human desires. The law is fol-
lowed because it is the law. Hitler's Ger-
many was an extreme of this aspect of posi-
tivism.
63Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-
Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 464 (1954).
". FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 64-65.
6 I ld. at 110-14.
6 6 Id. at 110.
The inherited conception of law that
ruled unchallenged, among German legal
scholars, for decades taught that "law is
law." This view was helpless when con-
fronted with lawlessness in statutory form.
No matter how unjust the statute, as long as
it was enacted into legal form-as long as
it was a sovereign command and an ac-
complished fact of the power of the state
-it had to be treated as law. Thus, posi-
tivism paved the way for Hitler.67
Professor Fuller sees examples of the
same dangerous type of thinking in our
country. There was an article in the Boston
Herald apropos of the investigatory
methods of a certain senator. The writer
said that he had heard all of the debate
over the senator's methods and had con-
sulted three lawyers-one opposed to the
senator, one in favor and one indifferent.
The writer asked the three lawyers if the
senator had done anything illegal, and the
answer was, no. Fuller concludes: "That to
me is an extremely dangerous state of pub-
lic opinion where law is simply taken as
the authority determining what should be
done and should not be done, and its
moral roots are ignored." 6
Professor Fuller worries that many un-
dergraduates today are receiving from the
"behavioral sciences" an indoctrination in
the notion that the whole social process is
a scramble for "power." He is disturbed
about the deep roots this teaching seems
to strike in many students who glibly re-
ject as "naive" any view that seems to con-
tradict it.69
67 Fuller, supra note 63, at 483-84, 465-66; Fuller,
supra note 44, at 659.
(8 FULLER, ON THE TEACHING OF LAW IN THE
LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM 86 (Berman ed.
1956).
69 Id. at 42.
Keeping duly enacted law distinct from
personal opinion and individual moral con-
viction-a basic tenet of positivism-is one
of the most worthy goals of civilization. But
in a review of Buckland's Some Reflec-
tions on Jurispurdence, Professor Fuller
warns of the danger of pretending that this
goal has been achieved when it hasn't. It
is doubly dangerous, he adds, to suppose
that this goal is, under all circumstances,
and in all relationships the most important
objective man can strive for.7 0
Why Positivism Succeeds
Noting that the harmful inhibitive effects
of positivism have been felt in American
legal thinking for nearly a century, 71 Pro-
fessor Fuller indicates that some of the rea-
sons for its success are its worthy aims, its
real contributions to legal thinking and its
alliance with the "scientific method." Posi-
tivism's worthy purposes include: the pres-
ervation of order in society by clearly de-
fining what -is law and by encouraging fidel-
ity to law;7" the placing of law-making not
in the hands of the judiciary but in the
legislature; and, the facilitation of scientific
understanding of law and government. 73
This latter goal, the scientific understand-
ing of law, includes the separation of law
from morality. The positivist fear of moral-
ity in the law stems not only from the pos-
sibility of anarchy when law can be
branded and repudiated by citizens as im-
moral-but even more important-from
the possibility of an over-purposive inter-
pretation of law that would fasten on so-
70 Fuller, Book Review, 59 HARv. L. REV. 826,
828 (1946).
71 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 61.
72 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 113; Fuller,
supra note 44, at 632.
73 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 36, at 113.
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ciety some all-embracing orthodoxy.74
These positivist goals appeal to, and have
enlisted support from, many a non-positiv-
ist legal thinker.
Besides sympathizing with the purposes
and goals of the positivists, Professor Fuller
acknowledges that positivism has made its
contributions to American legal thinking:
One seldom encounters a law review article
today [1934] of the type so common ten
years ago [1924], in which the writer starts
with an inquiry into the "nature" of some
legal concept and ends by deducing all sorts
of important consequences from the sup-
posed inner nature of the concept,-without
more than a passing reference to the prac-
tical effects of his conclusions, and then
with an air of condescension, as if to com-
pliment the facts for showing good judge-
ment in conforming to his theories.7- 5
Fuller acknowledges that Kelsen did the
law a favor in purging it of such imagin-
ings as "the sovereign. ' " 6 Also, there was
Professor Cook's war on "verbal trifling"
or "unconscious metaphysics"77 and Pro-
fessor Llewellyn's crusade against concepts
which he attacked as the shadowy figments
of our minds, wholly unworthy of the
simple faith the conceptualist placed in
them.7 s Positivists by their emphasis on the
concrete - on the raw datum of law -
represented a healthy reaction to over-
conceptualism in legal thinking.
Still another important reason for legal
positivism's century of success has been its
alliance with the scientific method. 79 "The
religion of modern man is science, and he
74 Fuller, supra note 63, at 463; Fuller, supra note
44, at 671.
75 Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 429, 443 (1934).
76 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 72-73.
77 Id. at 63.
78 Fuller, supra note 75, at 443.
79 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 117.
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prefers whenever possible to couch his
thoughts in the language of piety, that is,
in words that sound scientific.' 8
This holy alliance with science has
given positivism the appearance of modern-
ity and sophistication. Because of the be-
lief that scientific thinking alone was in-
tellectually respectable, postivism alone
had "brave things to say. '81 And Holmes,
who had such great influence on American
legal thinking,8 2 was one of this holy alli-
ance's8 3 most revered prophets.
While Professor Fuller sympathizes with
many of the things that positivism has
tried to do, he insists that the goals of
positivism will never be achieved, because
the positivist tries to separate the insepar-
able: is and ought; fact and value. And in
attempting the impossible - to eliminate
oughtness and value from law-posi-
tivism is strangling legal development and
endangering the future of society by failing
to give needed legal structure to the vast
social changes of the time. By eliminating
purpose and morality from the law, posi-
tivism leaves untouched the difficult issues
of the day where real dangers lie.8 4 Pro-
fessor Fuller believes that the answers to
the pressing problems of the day, and a
80 Fuller, Freedon-A Suggested Analysis, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1955).
81 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 104.
82 Id. at 117.
83 Professor Fuller has no patience with the scien-
tific method as applied to law. He points out that
the proper method for solving a problem depends
to a large degree on the kind of problem to be
solved. Just because a method works in the natu-
ral sciences, there is no guarantee that it will work
also in the social sciences or in the law. See
FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 118-19; Fuller,
supra note 80, at 1307-09; Fuller, supra note 63,
at 475-76.
84 Fuller, supra note 44, at 661-63; Fuller, supra
note 63, at 466-67.
real understanding of law, lie in a return
to the true fundamental basis of law and
order:
For I believe that law is not a datum, but
an achievement that needs ever to be re-
newed, and that it cannot be renewed un-
less we understand the springs from which
its strength derives. 85
What these "springs" are is the content
of Professor Fuller's own natural law view.
Fuller's Natural Law View
Professor Fuller's initial (1940) sweep-
ing critique of positivism was delivered as a
series of three lectures, later bound in a
small volume and published under the title
of The Law in Quest of Itself."' Within the
next year over twenty reviews of this 147-
page work had appeared. The reaction
showed that Fuller had touched the law
at a very sensitive spot.
Professor Fuller's critics, most of whom
were sympathetic, made three general
points: (1) Fuller's critique was too nega-
tive; (2) Fuller's own natural law position
was too vague; (3) the term "natural law"
was an unhappy choice of terminology.
In his subsequent writings, however, Pro-
fessor Fuller has met the challenge of his
critics by clarifying his natural law views.
Professor Fuller's interest in the natural
law stems from his encounter with the
dominant legal philosophy of the present
generation - legal positivism. As we have
seen, although Fuller has many funda-
mental disagreements with legal positivism
on the practical level, his basic quarrel
with positivism is at a speculative level-
85 Fuller, supra note 63, at 467.
8f; These three lectures were sponsored by the
Julius Rosenthal Foundation For General Law
and delivered at the Law School of Northwestern
University at Chicago, April 1940.
the impossibility of a complete separation
of is and ought in the law.
When Fuller came upon a legal philos-
ophy that desired to purge the law of
oughtness and purpose- something that
to his mind partook of the very nature of
law-he was forced to speak out. And
he spoke out even though at the time
(1940) he was not very clear himself on
what he meant by law as it involved pur-
pose -which he called natural law:
Natural law, on the other hand, is the view
which denies the possibility of a rigid sepa-
ration of the is and the ought, and which
tolerates a confusion of them in legal dis-
cussion. There are, of course, many "sys-
tems" of natural law. Men have drawn
their criteria of justice and of right law
from many sources: from the nature of
things, from the nature of man, from the
nature of God. But what unites the various
schools of natural law, and justifies bring-
ing them under a common rubric, is the
fact that in all of them a certain coales-
cence of the is and the ought will be
found.87
This original insight- the inseparabil-
ity of is and ought in the law - has always
been at the basis of Professor Fuller's natu-
ral law view. The subsequent development
of Professor Fuller's natural law view has
been an examination of the oughtness in
law -its discovery by reason, its standard
in nature, and its working out in practice.
Reason and Natural Law
Professor Fuller's original plea for natu-
ral law seemed to be nothing more precise
than a plea for the natural creative role of
reason in discovering the law that ought
to be - discovering the basic principles of
justice underlying the relations of men, and
applying these principles to human rela-
87 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 5-6.
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tions.18 Just how reason would do this -
discover the "just" law or the "right" law
for promoting effective and satisfactory life
in common - Professor Fuller illustrates
by a simple example.
We are asked to imagine a shipwreck.
The survivors are cast off on an isolated
corner of the earth. All have a convenient
case of amnesia that has wiped out the mem-
ory of previous social existence. When dis-
putes arise a judge is selected. This judge,
says Fuller, would soon realize:
That it was his responsibility to see that
his decisions were right-right for the
group, right in the light of the group's pur-
poses and the things that its members
sought to achieve through common effort.
Such a judge would find himself driven in-
to an attempt to discover the natural prin-
ciples underlying group life, so that his
decisions might conform to them. He
would properly feel that he, no less than
the engineers and carpenters and cooks in
the company, was faced with the task of
mastering a segment of reality and of dis-
covering and utilizing its regularities for
the benefit of the group.8 9
Fuller states that if you take this desert-
island judge and put him down in a society
that is already a real and going concern,
essentially only one new factor has been
introduced into the judging process - the
force of established institutions has now
become one of the realities that the judge
must respect in making his decisions. 90
Fuller's faith in human reason's ability
to solve the problems of successful group
living, does not mean that he has unlimited
confidence in human reason. He disclaims
any "code of nature" that can solve all
88 Id. at 3, 104.
89 FULLER, REASON AND FIAT IN CASE LAW 4-7
(1943).
90' Id. at 10.
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cases. 91 He severely criticizes the "ex-
tremists" of the natural law school who
maintain all law is the product of reason,
and that there is no place for arbitrary fiat
in the law. Sometimes the law must be
arbitrary.
Fuller adds we can never have a law
without both reason and fiat. The necessity
of fiat in the law is itself a reality that rea-
son must take into account." But at the
same time law can never be stated solely
in terms of fiat, i.e., in terms of power re-
lations without reference to its rational
basis (ethics) .93 Indeed without a rational
basis, there is no legitimate authority.
Another area where Fuller recognizes
the limits of reason relates to the pursuit
of "justice" itself:
It seems impossible to give an adequate
definition of justice; the quest for justice is
in this sense an "irrational" one. Yet this
does not prevent the lawyer from recog-
nizing clear cases of injustice. 94
The lawyer who cannot define justice
is compared to the doctor who cannot de-
fine health, but who can recognize disease.
Fuller holds that the lawyer who gives up
his quest for justice in the name of a nar-
row rationalism is no more justified than
the doctor who gives up healing the sick
because he cannot define health with
Euclidean exactness. Justice is one of those
imperfectly rationalized elements which we
are intellectually and morally bound to rec-
ognize in the law.95
But even though reason has its limita-
tions, it must be pushed as far as it will
9' Fuller, supra note 43; Fuller, A Rejoinder to
Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL L. F. 83, 84 (1958).
92 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 89, at 11.
93 Id. at 29.
9 4 FULLER, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 120 (1941).
95 Ibid.
go in discovering the basic principles that
underlie the successful living together of
men9 -even if this means entering the
"forbidden territory of metaphysics and
ethics."9 7
Justice and Reason
Professor Fuller has put in tentative
form a general exposition of his own ra-
tional quest for the principles of a just
social order.99 He points out that the basic
task of the lawyer is to find ways by which
people can live and work together success-
fully. But men cannot live and work to-
gether without some organizing principles
that will resolve conflicts and promote co-
operative action. There are four ways by
which men may achieve the necessary
order. These are:
1) joint discovery and recognition of
the common need;
2) the establishment of some rule-mak-
ing power;
3) the solution of disputes by adjudica-
tion; and,
4) negotiation and agreement among
the interested parties.
Corresponding to these four ways of
achieving order are four principles of
order:
1) the principle of the common need;
2) the principle of legitimated power;
3) the principle of adjudication; and,
4) the principle of contract.19
96 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 109; FULLER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 104 (1949);
Fuller, supra note 91.
9' Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV. 35,
47 (1950).
98 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 96, at 693.
99 Id. at 694.
The principle of the common need is a
sine qua non and the most basic of the
four principles. A just or right ordering of
society can be attained only by a discovery
and recognition of the common need. The
other three principles are intelligible and
defensible only as necessary supplements
to the principle of the common need, and
as devices or procedures for realizing the
common need. It would be ideal if the
common need could be achieved without
resort to adjudication or the use of power,
but such a spontaneous corporate spirit
is not found in human society. Thus, the
three lesser principles must serve the prin-
ciple of the common need in order to ap-
proach that order by which men can best
live and work together.
The three lesser principles are never
ends in themselves; they can only be un-
derstood as indirect means of achieving re-
sults that are likely to approximate the
common need. Each of the lesser three
principles is a kind of pis aller (last
resort), a principle that must be resorted
to only if the common need cannot be
otherwise attained-either because of an
irreconcilable conflict between individual
and social values, or because the common
need is not properly perceived and under-
stood.100
What is the common need? Professor
Fuller equates the common need with the
law of nature. To achieve the common
need is to approach a just or right ordering
of society. It is a search for the most effec-
tive and least disruptive pattern of order
that will satisfy men's desires and interests,
reconciling individual interests with social
values. When the members of society act
in accordance with the perceived common
100 Id. at 695-737.
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need, their actions are dictated by the ne-
cessities of the situation and their shared
understanding of what those necessities
demand of each of them. 101
How is the common need to be achieved
in practice? There must be an intense
study of the factual situation to which the
pattern of order is to relate. The common
need is that pattern of order that is right
for the situation-that reaches the result
most consonant with the interests and de-
sires of the generality of men. 11 2 If com-
missioned to draft a comprehensive statute
for the regulation of automobile traffic, the
legislator primarily would seek
a set of rules that would keep people from
running into one another, which would, at
the same time, not slow traffic unduly or
create impossible burdens of administra-
tion for traffic officers and traffic courts.
In other words, the sources of his law
would lie in the necessities inherent in the
problem with which he had to deal. Given
a situation, and given certain generally
felt and accepted human desires about that
situation, his task would be to work out
a way of effectuating those desires within
the compulsions of the situation to which
they relate.11 3
Some have criticized the principle of the
common need because it is nebulous. Pro-
fessor Fuller admits that the common need
is not a mathematical calculation or a pat-
ent medicine guaranteed to cure. Rather it
is the application of a principle of just
ordering to a particular concrete situation
involving the use of discretion.114 When
the critics argue that no one can point to
101 Id. at 694-98, 706, 736.
102 Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in
the Law School Curriculum, I J. LEGAL ED. 457,
499 (1949).
10 Ibid.
'o4 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 96, at 695-97;
FULLER, op. cit. supra note 89, at 25-27.
FULLER
any particular rule of law or of the social
order that is unambiguously demanded by
the common need, Fuller replies:
Because the common interest does not tell
us everything, there is no reason to con-
clude that it tells us nothing. Those who re-
ject the principle of the common need be-
cause it does not dot all the i's or cross all
the t's should recall the saying of an an-
cient Chinese philosopher, Mencius: When
a cobbler undertakes to make a pair of
shoes without knowing the measure of the
feet, he does not end by making a bushel
basket.10 5
Human Nature: The Standard
At this point we may ask: what keeps
Professor Fuller's natural law (common
need) from being something purely rela-
tive? Fuller has stated that the natural law
is derived from the "compulsions of the
situation."10 What is to prevent his natural
law from being what men want rather than
what ought to be? The positivists have crit-
icized the natural law for failing to tran-
scend "personal predilections."'0 7 Can Pro-
fessor Fuller's explanation of natural law
escape this criticism?
Professor Fuller does not agree with
those who hold that the object of law is
simply to resolve conflicts. 108 He insists on
a right ordering of society and looks for
right solutions to problems. 1 9 The right
and just solution makes good law.1"0
105 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 96, at 696.
506 Fuller, supra note 102, at 499.
107 FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5
(1940).
108 Fuller, supra note 91, at 103-04.
109 FULLER, Op. cit. supra note 96, at 695; Fuller,
supra note 102, at 499; Fuller, supra note 97, at
45.
110 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Re-
ply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 644
(1958).
But the right and just solution is not
purely subjective. There is an objective
moral goodness. There are good and bad
laws just as there are good and bad pur-
poses of law. Arguing on the basis of the
intrinsic appeal of law, Fuller denies that
evil aims of the law have as much coher-
ence and inner logic as good aims. Pro-
fessor Fuller also has an answer for the
ethical skeptics. In his review of A Dialectic
of Morals: Towards the Foundations of
Political Philosophy, he distinguishes his
own answer from that of Professor Mnr-
timer Adler.
Adler refutes ethical skepticism by be-
ginning with a minimal good. Thus, Adler
argues that if the unhampered pursuit of
pleasure were man's only goal, at least one
standard of preference would have validity,
namely, that as between two pleasures, the
greater should be preferred.
Professor Fuller begins his refutation of
ethical skepticism with the maximal bad.
He asks us to imagine a society in which
all ordinarily accepted values are reversed
-a society in which treason, murder, and
rape are officially encouraged; in which
breach of contract is rewarded and its ob-
servance punished; a society where assist-
ing one's neighbor is regarded as a heinous
crime. No sane person would hesitate to
call such a society "bad." It would be bad
by every conceivable standard, whether it
be the dignity of man, the maximization of
happiness, the fullest realization of human
capacities."'
When Professor Fuller seeks a right
solution derived from the "compulsions of
the situation," he sees the most fundamen-
tal element in this human "situation" as
-' Fuller, Book Review, 9 U. CH. L. REV. 759,
760 (1942).
the only standard of rightness-human
nature. What is right for the "situation"
depends upon what is right for man.
To say "man" is, necessarily, to say
"purpose" or "oughtness," since man is by
nature a self-directing, purpose-achieving
creature. And what is right for man (the
right purpose) must be in conformity with
man's nature:
A purpose is, as it were, a segment of a
man. The whole man, taken in the round,
is an enormously complicated set of in-
terrelated and interacting purposes. This
system of purposes constitutes his nature,
and it is to this nature that natural law
looks in seeking a standard for passing
ethical judgements. That is good which ad-
vances man's nature; that is bad which
keeps him from realizing it. 1 12
Natural law philosophy is not confined
in its application to the study of law. Every
science that has something to say about
human activity is involved in natural-law
thinking. Fuller illustrates:
Take, for example, psychoanalysis. This
theory originated in a context of thought
that certainly seems remote from the phil-
osophy of natural law. Yet it assumes that
the purpose-forming system called a man
may be in need of being "straightened out,"
and at the same time contains within it-
self the sign posts that will direct the
straightening-out process. This is the es-
sence of the natural law position. If the
psychoanalyst does not do something
roughly equivalent to helping his patient
realize his "true nature" then his whole
profession loses intelligible meaning.' 13
Professor Fuller also holds that there are
natural laws of social order. This is so be-
cause society is made up of men, and the
112Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-
Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 472 (1954).
11 Id. at 473.
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right ordering of men living together must
respect human nature just as much as the
individual acts of a man must respect his
nature. Social arrangements are therefore
not infinitely pliable. There are certain ends
of society, certain patterns of order-
whether agreed upon by a majority or
imposed by a dictator- that will fail to
achieve a successful ordering of society if
human nature is not respected. 114
Professor Fuller points out that business
administration, economics, and political
science do not operate on the premise of
the infinite pliability of ends. A factory
management does not simply dream up an
ideal pattern of production. Management
is concerned with the natural laws under-
lying the production of goods. Many fac-
tors are taken into consideration: individ-
ual and social psychology, the construction
and operation of the human body, etc. Ful-
ler notes that economic theory today holds
to the view that the forms through which
economic objectives can be achieved are
limited in number, and that for certain
objectives, certain forms must be employed.
Fuller sees political science as being con-
cerned with the effects that flow from the
adoption of different forms of political
order.115
In law and sociology, Professor Fuller
says we should find the same line of in-
quiry. But he notes that we do not because
of the influence of empirical science, which
treats man not as a self-directing phenom-
enon, but as determined (thus determinable
to any conceivable order or social arrange-
ment). Fuller insists that the sociologist and
legal philosopher must treat man under
both aspects-as determined and as mak-
114 Id. at 473-74.
115 Id. at 474-75.
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ing choices. In making choices, man's na-
ture must be respected, and therefore there
are limits of the possible forms of social
arrangement. The sociologist and lawyer
should discover and utilize the natural laws
of social order-natural in the sense that
they represent compulsions necessarily con-
tained in certain ways of organizing men's
relations with one another.116
Professor Fuller points out that the Rus-
sians who tried to impose a pure Marxian
pattern on society failed when it came to
law. Pashukanis theorized that all law was
capitalist, finding its rationale in exchange
and in the market essential to capitalism.
Fuller says it is interesting to compare the
pure Marxian theory of the now dis-
credited and liquidated Pashukanis with the
unblushing "bourgeois" elements that ap-
pear in the later theories of Vyshinsky.1
7
Problems Raised
Even though Professor Fuller insists that
human nature is the standard for measur-
ing human purposive activity, there are still
many questions to be answered:
1) Has the natural law the right to sit
in judgment over positive law, and counsel
a disregard of any enactment of the positive
law that violates natural law?
In principle, Fuller answers yes. He
holds that when a statute is sufficiently evil
it ceases to be law."" Admittedly, when it
is suggested that this imperious attitude
toward positive law be adopted, there is
ground for real concern. However, if the
116 Id. at 475-76.
117 Fuller, Pashukania and Vyshinsky: A Study in
the Development of Marxian Legal Theory, 47
MICH. L. REV. 1,157, 1165 (1949).
118 Fuller, supra note 110, at 655; Fuller, supra
note 91, at 91.
matter be examined candidly, it will be
found that there is no one who cannot
imagine himself, even as a judge, being
faced by a law so infamous that he would
feel bound to disobey it. For most of us,
says Fuller, such a situation could only
arise in the event of some great dislocation
in the ordinary processes of government,
such as might be occasioned by a dictator-
ship or an occupation by enemy forces.,,"
In the Hitler regime, for example, the most
serious deteriorations in legal morality took
place precisely in those areas of the law
where the purposes of the law were most re-
pulsive to human nature. In other words,
where one would have been most tempted
to say, " 'This is so evil it cannot be a law,'
one could usually have said instead, 'This
thing is the product of a system so oblivi-
ous to the morality of law that it is not en-
titled to be called a law.' "120
Thus it is only by way of exception that
the natural law would be invoked to over-
rule positive law. As a general rule, the
natural law demands obedience to positive
law-even though the particular positive
law in question is not "good" law in all
respects. Indeed, the very obligation of
obeying positive law derives from the na-
tural law, as this obligation cannot come
from positive law itself.121
2) Is there a "higher law" that sits in
judgment over the natural law?
Professor Fuller makes it clear that he
does not accept any doctrine of natural law
which asserts that the demands of the
natural law can be the subject of an author-
itative pronouncement, or the notion that
there is a "higher law" transcending the
concerns of this life against which human
139 Fuller, supra note 112, at 467-68.
120 Fuller, supra note 110, at 661.
121 Fuller, supra note 112, at 467-68.
enactments must be measured and declared
invalid in case of conflict. 12 Fuller declares
that these exclusions are "at least as an-
cient as Aristotle, in whom I find no trace
of the elements I reject."' 23
An authoritative interpretation of moral
law, for example, the November 7, 1949
speech of Pius XII to the Union of Cath-
olic Italian Lawyers regarding the duty of
Catholic judges in divorce actions, troubles
Fuller and raises "grave issues.' '1 24 But Ful-
ler can see why the Catholics believe in an
authoritative interpretation of the natural
law, even though he doesn't share these
same beliefs himself. Indeed, Fuller pays
the Catholics a compliment for their con-
tribution to natural law thinking:
It should be remarked at this point that
it is chiefly in Roman Catholic writings
that the theory of natural law is consid-
ered, not simply as a search for those
principles that will enable men to live to-
gether successfully, but as a quest for
something that can be called "a higher
law." This identification of natural law
with a law that is above human laws seems
in fact to be demanded by any doctrine
that asserts the possibility of an authorita-
tive pronouncement of the demands of
natural law. In those areas affected by such
pronouncements as have so far been is-
sued, the conflict between Roman Catholic
doctrine and opposing views seems to me
to be a conflict between two forms of posi-
tivism. Fortunately, over most of the area
with which lawyers are concerned, no such
pronouncements exist. In these areas I
think those of us who are not adherents of
its faith can be grateful to the Catholic
Church for having kept alive the rationalis-
tic tradition in ethics.12 5
3) Even if a "higher law" be excluded,
122 Fuller, supra note 91, at 84.
123"bid.
12 Fuller, supra note 110, at 638.
15Id. at 660.
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what about the fear of the positivists that
the purposive interpretation of law will be
pushed too far?
The positivists fear not so much that a
purposive interpretation of law will lead to
anarchy as that it will lead to the opposite
of anarchy-the imposing on society of
some all-embracing orthodoxy 126 or "im-
moral morality." 127 Fuller shares this fear
with the positivists.121 He sees the possible
danger of imposing conformity which would
be a threat to human dignity and freedom.
As an example of the kind of development
in law which he fears, Fuller cites a hypo-
thetical statute which forbids golf on Sun-
day. Conceivably, such a law might be in-
terpreted as a law imposing compulsory
church attendance and recitation of pray-
ers. This type of judicial interpretation is
a threat to human dignity because it com-
mands something that only has meaning
when done voluntarily. 129
How is purposive interpretation to be
kept within bearable proportions? Fuller
answers that just to say "common sense"
is not enough. To give this answer would
be an evasion, and would amount to say-
ing that although we know the answer, we
cannot say what it is. Fuller apologizes for
his own lack of preciseness, but does offer
a suggestion. Asserting that judges must
have respect for the concept of legal struc-
ture, Fuller points out that a statute or a
rule of common law has, either explicitly,
or by virtue of its relation with other rules,
something that may be called a structural
integrity. Structural integrity is what we
have in mind when we speak of the "intent
of the statute"-though we know it is men
326 Fuller, supra note 112, at 463.
127 Fuller, supra note 110, at 635-36.
128 Fuller, supra note 112, at 463.
129 Fuller, supra note 110, at 669-7 1.
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who have intentions and not words on
paper. The judge must limit his creative
role to the confines of the structure of the
law.13 0
4) If the jurist confines himself to "legal
structure," how deeply into human purpose
can the legal philosophy go? What, if any-
thing, can he say about the ultimate pur-
pose or end of man and of the law?
Here we move into the very blueprint of
the legal structure itself. How are we to
draw the basic lines of the legal structure?
What is the end of law? For what purposes
do its constraints exist? We have seen that
the goal of society is the achievement of
peace and order; that the discovery and
implementation of the common need pro-
mote the successful living together of men.
But how to achieve the common need? Pro-
fessor Fuller has told us that the answer
lies in an understanding of human nature
and of the human social order. But how
far, how deep, is the law to penetrate the
complex, purpose-achieving animal we call
man? How much can the law understand
man and specify his goals? l"1
Professor Fuller believes that the law
should not try to go too far or ask too
much. He holds that the law ought to be
content to discover and implement those
minimum principles which make the law
possible. 132 Here Professor Fuller makes an
important distinction. He holds that the law
should not try to discover ultimate pur-
poses as such. Rather the law should con-
centrate on the procedures or social forms
through which the ultimate, by collective
activity, are determined. Arguing on the
theory that if we do things the right way,
130 Id. at 670.
131 Fuller, supra note 97, at 35.
132 Fuller, supra note 112, at 463.
we are likely to do the right things, Fuller
believes that if the procedures and social
forms are sound, the results achieved
through them will tend to be sound.13 3 For
example, a constitution drafted for a coun-
try emerging from violence and disorder
should establish a basic procedural frame-
work for future governmental action and
substantive limitations should be kept at a
minimum:
In so far as possible, substantive aims
should be achieved procedurally, on the
principle that if men are compelled to act
in the right way, they will generally do the
right things.13 4
Why does not the law look for ulti-
mates? One reason we have already seen:
because such a search is really the search
of metaphysics. The law would be asking
questions bigger than itself. But there are
some ultimates that the law must seek.
Professor Fuller has given us one such ulti-
mate when he asks, what do we mean by a
"right" decision. 135 At the same time, Ful-
ler warns, human terminal ends are ob-
scure, and our reasoning powers sometimes
fail us:
I have no intention of attempting to draw
here the line at which the effort to define
ends should be permitted to relax. I should
like to suggest, however, that this is a mat-
ter in which the cultural forces that sur-
round us play a more important part than
we generally realize. How far we should
pursue ultimates is a question more likely
to be determined by currents of intellect-
ual fashion than by deliberate choice. The
pressures of our present intellectual climate
are toward truncating the inquiry at the
earliest possible point.136
133 Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute
to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 176,
204 (1948).
I1 Fuller, supra note 110, at 643.
135 Fuller, supra note 97, at 45.
1361 d. at 36.
Even though Fuller sees the quest for
ultimates as a difficult quest, a push into
the unknown and obscure-still he does
not hold with the positivists that human
ends and values cannot be the object of
reasoned demonstration. As a natural law
exponent, Professor Fuller sees the work of
the natural law involving the selection of
apt means for the realization of a given end
by an activity which engages man's reason
and his capacity for accurate analysis and
observation. But Fuller points out that ends
and means are not as simple as they first
seem. In actual concrete situations and in
actual decisions, means and ends no longer
arrange themselves in tandem fashion, but
move in circles of interaction. This com-
plex of ends and means can be the object
of reasoned demonstration, but it is impos-
sible to assign in advance precise limits to
the role of reason. Fuller therefore urges
that we push our understanding as far as it
will take us into the obscure area where
means and ends interact. He says we must
seek collectively to discover as much agree-
ment in this area as the nature of the case
permits.137
Because of the complex interaction be-
tween ends and means, and because of the
obscurity involved in searching out the ulti-
mates, Fuller sets the sights of his natural
law approach more on means than on ends
-but his approach includes both. Thus
Fuller concentrates more on legal processes
and social forms. He believes that if the
legal processes are perfected and thor-
oughly understood, the goals or ends which
result from the intelligent employment of
these processes will be the best goals for
man and society. It is not so much a ques-
''7 Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3
NATURAL L. F. 64, 68, 71-73 (1958).
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tion of defining ultimates, as defining the
conditions under which the ultimates are
realized."s Fuller calls this practical na-
tural law approach "Eunomics."'l
Eunomics
Eunomics is derived from the Greek,
and means "good law." Professor Fuller
chooses this term:
Because of the confusions invited by the
term "natural law," I believe we need a
new name for the field of study, and I sug-
gest the term "eunomics," which may be
defined as "the science, theory or study of
good order and workable arrangements. '"140
Professor Fuller goes on to describe the
limits of his proposed study:
Eunomics involves no commitment to
"ultimate ends." To be sure, it may reject
particular ends as presenting what Michael
Polanyi calls "unmanageable social tasks."
It may, in other words, reveal that there
are ends which seem in the abstract desir-
able, but for the attainment of which no
social form can be devised that will not in-
volve an obviously disproportionate cost.
But the primary concern of eunomics is
with the means aspect of the means-end
relation, and its contribution to the clari-
fication of ends will lie in its analysis of the
available means for achieving particular
ends.141
Professor Fuller stresses the means as-
pect of the means-end relation. He points
out that, in concrete decisions, means and
ends interact, and means have a decided
influence on ends. He suggests that the
failure to recognize the significance of this
interaction was the mistake of the natural
law school of 150 years ago. But Professor
138 Fuller, supra note 97, at 42; Fuller, supra no'e
137, at 73.
I311 Fuller, supra note 112, at 473.
140 Id. at 477.
141 Id. at 477-78.
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Fuller is careful to point out that eunomics
is not unmindful of ends:
In attempting to define a branch of social
study that might be called eunomics, I
stated that an acceptance of this subject as
worthy of pursuit implies no commitment
to "ultimate ends." I was careful not to
say that eunomics is indifferent to ends. In
view of the interaction of means and ends
any sharp distinction between a science of
means and an ethics of ends is impossible.
In leaving the problem of "ultimates" un-
resolved I mean merely to acknowledge
that after a careful study of the interaction
of means and ends with respect to a partic-
ular problem, men may still ,differ as to
what ought to be done and that eunomics
cannot promise to resolve all such dif-
ferences. 14 2
While eunomics stresses the means as-
pect of the means-end relation, it must not
concentrate too heavily on the means as-
pect. To concentrate on means to the ex-
clusion of ends (as is often found in eco-
nomics and sociology) leads to a situation
in which the various social disciplines (law,
sociology, economics) talk past each other
and no effective communication takes place
at all. This is another reason why Fuller
insists that eunomics consider ends and
means in interaction. 143 Eunomics also
helps solve the problems of a pluralistic
society. To immediately begin arguing
about ultimates cuts off discussion. Fuller
urges a reasoned analysis of the processes
or means as a way of airing and under-
standing ends and goals.
Where does human nature fit into euno-
mics? Fuller admits that in stating the case
for eunomics he had tried to keep it dis-
tinct from the question whether the nature
of man can furnish a meaningful standard
142 Id. at 480.
143 Ibid.
of ethical judgments. He has done this in
order to get those who reject the natural
law to accept eunomics and be party to the
discussion of the problems that beset soci-
ety in our day. But no matter how emphatic
the rejection of the natural law and human
nature as a standard, Fuller points out that
if certain constants and "social regularities"
persist through a change in suggested social
forms and procedures, these constants must
reflect some stability in the nature of man
himself. It is at this point that eunomics
reaches common ground with the natural
law theory.144
What is the relation between the prin-
ciples of the common need 4 and eu-
nomics? Although Professor Fuller does
not relate the two, it seems clear that
eunomics exists precisely in order to
achieve the common need-a just ordering
of society. The primary focus of eunomics
is upon the procedures or subsidiary prin-
ciples (adjudication, legitimate authority,
and contract) through which the common
need is attained.
The working out of eunomics and the
attainment of the common need in practice
requires that men get together, collaborate,
discuss, and reflect; that men try to under-
stand what the common need is, what the
best social forms and processes are, and
what effect these means have on social
goals.
Just as in the affairs of daily life, we all
know from personal experience that in
moments of crisis, consultation with a
friend will often help us to understand per-
sonal problems; so in the larger issues of
law and ethics, men may, by pooling their
intelligent resources, come to understand
144 Fuller, supra note 112, at 481.
1A5 See page 108 supra.
better what their true purposes are. Pro-
fessor Fuller calls this way of solving the
problems of law and ethics, the collabora-
tive articulation of shared purposes.146 In
other words, what ought to be done is im-
proved by discussion and reflection. This
collaboration of men and ideas not only
helps toward the choosing of a better
means, but can clarify the end as well.141
It is the collaborative articulation of shared
purposes that has produced the traditional
case by case development of the English
and American common law. This is the
way the common law has worked itself
pure through the centuries and kept pace
with the changes in the social order. 148
Continued collaboration is our hope for
the future. Professor Fuller points out that
our republic was conceived in the spirit of
natural law. We enacted constitutional
guarantees of free speech on the theory
that through discussion men find truth, and
that truth, when found, should regulate our
lives and institutions.' 9 Fuller insists social
change can only take place peacefully in a
natural law climate-where ideas can com-
pete with each other for men's acceptance
and the successful ordering of society. In
the long run, ideas compete with each
other successfully not because they are
espoused by a majority or can be forced
on society by an effective power in society;
rather ideas compete successfully only to
the extent of their reasonableness and con-
sequent acceptance by society.2 ° With the
146 Fuller, supra note 137, at 73-74.
1.17 Fuller, supra note 110, at 668.
1,48 Fuller, supra note 137, at 74; Fuller, A Re-
joinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL L. F. 83,
96, 98 (1958).
149 FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
724 (1949).
150 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 107, at 110-14,
121-23.
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philosophy of positivism, which excludes
purpose from the law and which therefore
stifles development in the law, we tend to
live on today with the successful ideas of
social order of the past. 151 We cannot go
on for long with a sterile positivism. We
need new solutions for the pressing prob-
lems of our own day. So men must get to-
gether and seek to understand the facts of
our modern industrial society. By the col-
laborative articulation of shared purposes,
men must discover the ideas and patterns
of order that spring from the nature of man
and society and that provide the only an-
swer to the challenge of our times.112
Conclusion
Professor Fuller does not associate him-
self with any particular school of natural
law. But Professor H. Gill Reuschlein, Dean
of the University of Villanova Law School,
who has studied some seventy different
American writers in jurisprudence, classi-
fies Fuller with the "Integrative Jurisprud-
ence School"-with Benjamin Cardozo,
Roscoe Pound, Huntington Cairns, Morris
R. Cohen, Jerome Hall, and Edmond N.
Cahn.'" Professor Fuller is pleased with
this classification."' (Reuschlein classifies
Mortimer J. Adler, Robert Hutchins, and
Harold R. McKinnon as "Neo-Scholas-
tics."),",
Neither Scholastic nor Thomist, Profes-
sor Fuller is interested in and critical of
Thomistic legal analysis. He finds that when
151 Fuller, supra note 137, at 75-76.
152 Id. at 74-76; FULLER, op. cit. supra note 107,
at 126-27.
153 REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN
PROPHETS 404-05 (1951).
1.4 Fuller, Book Review, 12 LA. L. REV. 531, 532
(1952).
.55 REUSCHLEIN, op. cit. supra note 153.
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Thomists set themselves against legal posi-
tivism, the writings are largely polemic and
even vituperative in character, usually end-
ing up in an attack on Holmes.156
Professor Fuller is not satisfied with a
negative Thomism. He wants to know what
Thomism is for, not what it is against:
What does the neo-Thomist philosophy
say about such questions as the interpre-
tation of statutes, the proper role of the
judiciary, or the methods of reconciling
freedom and control in our complex mod-
ern society? I find no coherent answer to
questions of this sort in the published pro-
fessions of this philosophy.1
57
Fuller urges the Thomist to go back to
St. Thomas for coherent answers:
Though there are some startling things in
St. Thomas on such subjects as monsters
and angels, I personally have found him
full of useful wisdom on matters of law
and government. But curiously most of
the neo-Thomist writings in the legal field
are almost destitute of reference to St.
Thomas himself, who taught, as I read
him, that positive law is a human thing in-
tended to promote happiness of human
beings., 8s
At least one writer in the Thomist tra-
dition concurs with Professor Fuller in crit-
icizing neo-Thomists for failing to give
natural law coherence to pressing questions
in our complex modern society. Father Leo
R. Ward, C.S.C., writes:
As is clear to all and as some persons have
noted, Roman Catholics with their Aristo-
telian-Thomist background -itself gene-
rally not profoundly studied and renewed
in this regard -were almost the only per-
sons affirming natural law in the United
States, and their statements, quite possibly
true statements, were a bit lifeless, and had
-6 Fuller, supra note 154, at 534.
15T Ibid.
158 Id. at 534-35.
gone sterile. This was because they were
studied out of relation to reality and its
perpetual problems, and thus had come
to be as if meaningless. There are notable
exceptions, such as the works of Maritain
already mentioned, distinguished work by
Rommen and those by Lottin, and the work
by Robert Russell and that by Peter Stan-
lis; but the usual textbook treatment of
natural law had become incredible because
of missing the existential situation which
natural law doctrine is presumably de-
signed to meet.' 59
When we come to value Professor Ful-
ler's contribution to natural law thinking,
it would seem that it is to be found pre-
cisely in those areas where he and Father
Ward are most critical of neo-Thomists-
in giving the natural law relevance to the
existential situation.
The Thomist tends to begin his natural
law approach in the upper reaches of im-
mutable principle-principles of good and
evil, the sacredness of human life, the in-
violability of the human person. But the
Thomist has been found wanting when it
comes to the hard reasoning needed to pull
the principle down to the level of the
existential.
We find Professor Fuller, on the other
hand, beginning his natural law approach
on the concrete level. After a mastery of
the existential, he asks, "What is good for
man and good for society as measured by
the standard of human nature?" Fuller has
thought problems through on the lower
level -principles for interpreting statutes,
the proper role of the judiciary in a de-
mocracy, the methods of reconciling free-
dom and control in our complex society.
(Continued on page 137)
1."gWard, The Natural Law Rebound, 21 REV.
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